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EDITORIAL
The European Union’s New “Better Regulation”
Agenda: Between Procedures and Politics
Introduction to the Special Issue*
Mariolina Eliantonio & Aneta Spendzharova**
A Introduction
In May 2015, the European Commission unveiled its new “Better Regulation”
program,1 designed to ensure that European Union (EU) laws and policies are pre‐
pared, implemented and reviewed in an open and transparent manner, informed
by evidence and supported by business and citizens. It demonstrates persistent
attention to transparency in the preparation of laws, responsiveness to stake‐
holders and the public and reliance on evidence-based policy-making. It also
shows consideration for subsidiarity concerns in the context of the subsidiarity
and proportionality reviews in the Netherlands in 2013 and the United Kingdom
(UK) in 2014, and the impending withdrawal of the UK from the EU.2
* The special issue editors are grateful to the Centre for European Research in Maastricht (CERiM),
the Stichting Universiteitsfonds Limburg (SWOL) and the Research Stimulation Fund of the
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Maastricht University for their financial support to
convene a research workshop on “The ‘Better Regulation’ Agenda: Achievements and Challenges
Ahead,” held on 3-4 December 2015 in the Brussels Campus of Maastricht University. We would
like to thank the workshop participants for their excellent and insightful contributions. We
thank Christine Neuhold and Sophie Vanhoonacker for their valuable comments on the project
and encouragement.
** Mariolina Eliantonio is Associate Professor of European Administrative Law at Maastricht
University. Aneta Spendzharova is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Maastricht
University.
1 The rationale, aims and supporting documents of the “Better Regulation” package are available
at: <https:// ec. europa. eu/ info/ law/ law -making -process/ better -regulation -why -and -how_ en#
need>.
2 Government of the Netherlands, ‘European where necessary, national where possible’, 21 June
2013, available at: <https:// www. government. nl/ latest/ news/ 2013/ 06/ 21/ european -where -
necessary -national -where -possible>; Government of the UK, ‘Review of the balance of competen‐
ces between the United Kingdom and the European Union − subsidiarity and proportionality
report’, 27 March 2014, available at: <https:// www. gov. uk/ government/ consultations/
subsidiarity -and -proportionality -review -of -the -balance -of -competences>.
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“Better Regulation” has been extensively studied before, both at the Euro‐
pean and national levels.3 Specifically regarding the EU legal system, Radaelli
described the initial “Better Regulation” package as a new type of meta-regula‐
tion, which enabled policy-makers to combine diverse policy objectives in differ‐
ent areas.4 Furthermore, during the Barroso Commission, the Open Method of
Coordination (OMC) received particular attention in the “Better Regulation”
framework as a more flexible approach to policy-making in order to reach the Lis‐
bon agenda priorities of “jobs and growth.”5 Moreover, a growing body of EU gov‐
ernance literature explored whether non-hierarchical governance modes such as
experimentalist governance6 and reflexive governance7 supported by the “Better
Regulation” package were better suited to organizing collective action than hier‐
archical state-centered governance modes.
Following up on the White Paper on Governance (2000),8 and the Interinsti‐
tutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (2003),9 the renewed “Better Regula‐
tion” agenda (2015)10 aims to diminish the negative unintended consequences of
political bargaining in the Council and the EU legislative triangle and to deliver
better policies in the EU legal order, ultimately reinforcing the trust of European
citizens in the EU political processes and counteracting the perceived legitimacy
crisis11 for European integration. In order to achieve these overarching aims, the
“Better Regulation” agenda shows a renewed attention towards evidence-based
3 See, for example, C. Radaelli, ‘Whither Better Regulation for the Lisbon Agenda’, Journal of Euro‐
pean Public Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2007, pp. 190-207; M. Kaeding, ‘In Search of Better Quality of
EU Regulations for Prompt Transposition: The Brussels Perspective’, European Law Journal, Vol.
14, No. 5, 2008, pp. 583-603; C. Radaelli & A. Meuwese, ‘Better Regulation in Europe: Between
Public Management and Regulatory Reform’, Public Administration, Vol. 87, No. 3, 2009, pp.
639-654; C. Dunlop et al., ‘The many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A meta-analysis of
EU and UK cases’, Regulation and Governance, Vol. 6, 2012, pp. 23-45; A. Alemanno, ‘How Much
Better Is Better Regulation? Assessing the Impact of the Better Regulation Package on the Euro‐
pean Union – A Research Agenda’, European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2015, pp.
344-356; S. Tombs, ‘Making Better Regulation, Making Regulation Better?’, Policy Studies, Vol.
37, 2016, pp. 332-349.
4 Radaelli, 2007; see also C. Radaelli & F. de Francesco, Regulatory Quality in Europe: Concepts, Meas‐
ures and Policy Processes, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007.
5 S. Borrás & C. Radaelli, ‘The Politics of Governance Architectures: Creation, Change and Effects
of the EU Lisbon Strategy’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2011, pp. 463-484.
6 C. Sabel & J. Zeitlin, Experimentalist Governance in the European Union – Towards a new Architec‐
ture, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.
7 O. De Schutter & J. Lenoble, Reflexive Governance – Redefining the Public Interest in a Pluralistic
World, Hart Publishing, 2010.
8 Commission Communication of 25 July 2001, COM(2001) 428 final (European governance − A
white paper).
9 Interinstitutional agreement on better law-making [2003] OJ C 321, 31.12.2003, pp. 1-5.
10 Commission Communication of 19 May 2015, COM(2015) 215 final (Better regulation for better
results − An EU Agenda).
11 K. Featherstone, ‘Jean Monnet and the “Democratic Deficit” in the European Union’, Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, 1994, pp. 149-170; A. Follesdal, ‘Survey Article: The Legitimacy
Deficits of the European Union’, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2006, pp.
441-468; A. Follesdal & S. Hix, ‘Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to
Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2006, pp. 533-562.
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policy-making across the policy cycle. At the same time, the new “Better Regula‐
tion” agenda maintains the economic focus of the preceding package in terms of
rigorous cost-benefit evaluation of the expected policy outcomes through impact
assessment (IA), openness to market solutions and an emphasis on ‘cutting red
tape’ for businesses.12
Alemanno has found a large degree of continuity, compared to the preceding
“Better Regulation” package, in terms of intensive use of stakeholder consultation
systems, IAs and regulatory review, especially through boosting the REFIT evalua‐
tion system.13 The overall aim of the new package seems to be to optimize the use
of existing systems and add a few new instruments. The question, however,
remains whether, despite its lack of innovativeness vis-à-vis the previous pack‐
age, the new “Better Regulation” agenda is able to function as the legitimacy-
enhancing tool it aims to be. The “Better Regulation” agenda is also presented as a
politically neutral initiative, aimed at optimizing policy-making procedures. Yet,
concerns have been raised that “Better Regulation” might hide “fundamental
political and regulatory choices behind a language of ‘common sense’” and that
“political preferences will be wrapped in the language of ‘evidence-based’ policy-
making.”14
The literature on the preceding “Better Regulation” package has raised impor‐
tant questions that are still relevant for the new framework. For example, is it
still the case that “Better Regulation discourse is much more popular than Better
Regulation activities?”15 According to Torriti’s analysis of 60 IAs across different
policy sectors, IAs are frequently used to strategically justify a regulatory inter‐
vention to stakeholders and citizens.16 Lofstedt has also found a strategic use of
IAs as “lobbying tools” by different business and NGO interests, such as in the
case of the REACH directive.17 This raises a concern about the extent to which
business actors are still able to significantly shape EU legislation despite the
introduction of the new “Better Regulation” guidelines and tools. Additionally,
Radaelli and Meuwese have identified deliberate opposition from member states
to protect domestic interests and avoid costly domestic adjustments during the
12 C. Cecot et al., ‘An Evaluation of the Quality of Impact Assessment in the European Union with
Lessons for the US and the EU’, Regulation & Governance, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2008, pp. 405-424.
13 Alemanno, 2015.
14 K. Wegrich, ‘Which Results? Better Regulation and Institutional Politics’, European Journal of Risk
Regulation, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2015, p. 371.
15 C. Radaelli, ‘Diffusion Without Convergence: How Political Context Shapes the Adoption of Reg‐
ulatory Impact Assessment’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 5, 2007, p. 940.
16 J. Torriti, ‘Impact Assessment in the EU: A Tool for Better Regulation, Less Regulation or Less
Bad Regulation?’, Journal of Risk Research, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2007, pp. 239-276; See also Dunlop et
al., 2012.
17 R.E. Lofstedt, ‘The ‘Plateau-ing’ of the European Better Regulation Agenda: An Analysis of Activi‐
ties Carried out by the Barroso Commission’, Journal of Risk Research, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2007, pp.
423-447.
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implementation of EU legislation.18 Are member states still able to strategically
oppose and undermine the implementation of EU legislation?
Highlighting another important trend, Radaelli has pointed out the growing
politicization of the technocratic nature of the EU since the ratification of the
Treaty of Maastricht, given the proliferation of working groups, standardization
bodies and committees of experts in EU policy-making.19 On the one hand, politi‐
cization is a sign that the output of EU policy-making is more visible for citizens20
and, therefore, the EU is becoming more similar to national political systems. On
the other hand, “the problem of controlling regulatory bureaucracies and policy
experts will not be solved automatically as time goes by”21 and regulatory bodies
should take into account the presence of politicization in the policy process.
Radaelli has stressed that “the conclusion is not that technocracy has disappeared
in the EU, nor that depoliticization is feasible and desirable, but that expertise is
operating in an increasingly politicized environment.”22 Dawson takes the argu‐
ment even further by suggesting that politicization may undermine the attempts
to introduce more regulatory rationalization and vice versa.23 The articles in this
collection examine the relevance of these insights in the new EU “Better Regula‐
tion” package.
This special issue takes an interdisciplinary approach, bringing together legal
and political science perspectives. Taking stock of the literature on “Better Regu‐
lation” and the latest policy developments, the collection examines the conse‐
quences of the new “Better Regulation” agenda for law and policy-making in the
European Union, with the aim of answering one overarching research question: is
there evidence of enduring politicization despite the emphasis on neutral evi‐
dence-based policy-making? Additionally, the papers analyze the causes and con‐
sequences of such politicization. Furthermore, the contributions identify how
politicization and contestation limit the potential of the new “Better Regulation”
package to live up to its five core principles: effectiveness, coherence, participa‐
tion, openness and accountability.
In the following sections, the main findings of the articles contained in this
special issue will be summarized in order to answer the overarching research
question concerning the enduring politicization of the new “Better Regulation”
package. The contributions investigate four central themes in the “Better Regula‐
tion” package, following the policy cycle:
18 Radaelli & Meuwese, 2009; C. Radaelli, ‘Measuring Regulatory Quality? No Thanks (but Why
Not?)’, European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2012, pp. 108-112; A. Meuwese, ‘Regula‐
tory Scrutiny in Transition’, European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2015, pp. 359-360.
19 C. Radaelli, ‘The Public Policy of the European Union: Whither Politics of Expertise?’, Journal of
European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1999, p. 760.
20 A. Renda, ‘Too good to be true? A quick assessment of the European Commission’s new Better
Regulation Package’, CEPS Special Report No. 108/2015, 2015, available at: <https:// www. ceps. eu/
system/ files/ SR108AR_ BetterRegulation. pdf>.
21 Radaelli, 1999, p. 771.
22 Ibid.
23 M. Dawson, ‘Better Regulation and the Future of EU Regulatory Law and Politics’, Common Mar‐
ket Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 5, 2016, p. 1213.
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1 regulatory streamlining and cleaning-up of EU legislation;
2 stakeholder consultations and impact assessment;
3 policy evaluation and regulatory fitness and performance checks;
4 alternative forms of regulation, implementation and enforcement.
B Theme 1: Regulatory Streamlining and Cleaning-Up of EU Legislation
The new “Better Regulation” agenda gives a prominent role to a series of simplifi‐
cation initiatives in order to improve and streamline EU legislation. Most meas‐
ures fall within the scope of changes to existing law, ranging from codification
and recasting to repeal, review/sunset clauses and revision. The Commission has
emphasized that pending legislation or legislative proposals will be withdrawn if
found to be obsolete or if they are no longer in line with the EU policy objectives.
As a result, there has been a visible decrease in the number of legislative acts pre‐
pared for adoption by the European Parliament and the Council under the ordi‐
nary legislative procedure. The total number declined from 159 in 2011 to 48 in
2015.24 Furthermore, the Annual Work Programs of the Juncker Commission
have become more streamlined: there were 100 new priority initiatives and pack‐
ages in 2014 and only 23 new initiatives in both 2015 and 2016.25
The Commission has introduced a new Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB),
which replaced the Impact Assessment Board. According to the Commission, the
composition of the Board, including external members, will allow it to deliver
impartial opinions on the basis of rigorous analysis. The new Board will have a
strengthened role in the European policy process and a broader mandate to assess
the quality of the IAs that inform decision-making. In 2016, the RSB issued opin‐
ions on 60 IAs and about two in five were negative the first time around.26 Should
the Commission decide to take action in the absence of an adequate supporting
IA, it will have to explain why publically. In contrast to the common practice in
the past, the Board will also check major policy evaluations and ‘fitness checks’ of
existing legislation. In 2016, the Board formally considered 7 evaluations and
read 15 more that were annexed to IAs, but it did not issue positive or negative
summary ratings on evaluations.27
The current focus on streamlining and eliminating redundancies rests on the
assumption that rational policy design is feasible and realistic. It is assumed that
regulatory IAs will be helpful in identifying the most desirable policy options
before the adoption of legislation. This conjecture, however, is challenged by
recent work on polycentric governance systems which shows that when multiple
actors are in charge of designing and implementing policy, there is, inevitably,
some degree of incoherence, overlap and redundancy. For example, insights from
the literature on policy design in financial sector regulation suggest that complex
24 Commission Communication of 14 September 2016, COM(2016) 615 final, pp. 3-4.
25 Ibid.
26 European Commission, ‘Annual Report of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board 2016’, available at:
<https:// ec. europa. eu/ info/ sites/ info/ files/ 2016 -rsb -report_ en. pdf>, p. 7.
27 Ibid.
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policy domains generate rule overlap and contradictions in functionally related
areas.28 As long as these overlaps and inconsistencies do not subvert the overall
operation of the policy framework, they can create more responsiveness to stake‐
holders and resilience in the policy system if a particular solution fails. Further‐
more, regulatory streamlining is not simply a technical matter. It involves making
political choices, as repealing old laws and replacing them with new ones gener‐
ates new adaptation and compliance costs for stakeholders. Furthermore, there
are concerns about favoring a deregulation policy agenda, as shown by recent
criticism that the REFIT review of nature legislation will undermine Europe’s
sophisticated and far-reaching environmental protection regulatory regime.29 As
Dawson has argued, “this goal of ‘spreading regulatory best practice’ sits in ten‐
sion […] with a more political way to reading the regulatory process,” according to
which, once a measure is proposed by the Commission, the Union’s legislative
institutions decide whether to adopt or amend it, in accordance with explicitly
political criteria.30
Meuwese’s contribution to the special issue maps the various ways in which a
review of Commission IAs takes place, including by the RSB, the European
Ombudsman, the European Court of Auditors and the Court of Justice of the
European Union. As the author emphasizes, IAs are still one of the main tools to
try and make the “Better Regulation” agenda live up to its five core principles:
effectiveness, coherence, participation, openness and accountability. However, it
is important to assess the direction in which IA as a tool is developing. Meuwese
considers the evolution of IA from three distinct perspectives, each of which is
present in the policy discourse: a “deregulation perspective,” in which curtailing
regulatory intervention is the main goal, a “technocratic perspective,” which is
mainly interested in improving the rationality of regulatory decision-making and
a “participatory perspective,” which wants to open up the law-making process
with the ultimate aim of defying regulatory capture by “levelling the playing
field.”
Meuwese observes a dominant position of the “technocratic perspective” on
Better Regulation, but she also finds that none of the four actors considered (the
RSB, the European Ombudsman, the European Court of Auditors and the Court
of Justice of the European Union) appears to embrace a “deregulation perspec‐
tive.” The RSB can, at times, be strict when it comes to demanding that any “con‐
firmation bias” in favor of EU regulatory intervention is effectively countered in
the IA report. Finally, one may expect a championing of the “participatory per‐
spective” on the part of the European Ombudsman. While this may very well
develop in the future, Meuwese finds that the concrete interventions so far do
not appear to confirm this expectation.
28 A. Spendzharova, ‘Regulatory Cascading: Limitations of Policy Design in European Banking
Structural Reforms’, Policy and Society, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2016, pp. 227-237.
29 Renda, 2015, p. 2.
30 Dawson, 2016, p. 1216.
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C Theme 2: Stakeholder Consultations as a Tool of Fine-Tuning EU
Legislation
In the “Better Regulation” package, the Commission pledges to listen more closely
to citizens and stakeholders. The central aim is to be open to their feedback at
every stage of the policy process – from the first idea, to when the Commission
makes a proposal, through to the adoption of legislation and its evaluation. Build‐
ing on the existing minimum standards for consultation, the Commission’s new
“Better Regulation Guidelines” aim to strengthen the commitment to consulta‐
tions that “are of a high quality and transparent, reach all relevant stakeholders
and target the evidence needed to make sound decisions.”31 Thus, the standard
consultation process is extended to more types of EU legislation. The process is
decentralized within the DGs responsible for the underlying policy initiative, but
the Commission Secretariat plays a coordinating role in case the DG’s consulta‐
tion strategy is not deemed appropriate.
Among the achievements of the stakeholder consultation process, we could
single out bringing together a wide range of policy options in the consultation
documents as well as providing policy actors and analysts with unprecedented
systematic insight into the policy positions and preferences of diverse stakehold‐
ers.32
At the same time, the collection of large amounts of data about stakeholder
preferences does not directly translate into more streamlined and coherent policy
proposals. A first cognitive challenge is to make sense of the large amount of col‐
lected data. Then, in most cases, policy-makers will need to reconcile these
diverse preferences in coherent pieces of legislation. From this perspective, it is
worth noting that the “Better Regulation” package says nothing about what pol‐
icy-makers should do with the results of a consultation exercise. Furthermore, it
appears that the paradigm of consultation has not changed since the old “Better
Regulation” agenda, as consultations seem to be targeting individuals and groups
with expertise and technical knowledge rather than those who are mostly affected
by a certain policy initiative.33 Finally, consultations could be “framed in such a
way as to preclude certain outcomes.” Taking certain aspects of an initiative away
from the terms of reference in a consultation also removes them from the politi‐
cal discussion.34
As Spendzharova, Radulova and Surala show in their contribution to the spe‐
cial issue, public consultations provide rich evidence for the policy-making pro‐
cess, but they also contribute to the enduring politicization of regulatory deci‐
sions. Spendzharova et al. investigate the use of stakeholder consultations in the
31 European Commission, ‘Guidelines on Stakeholder Consultation’, available at: <http:// ec. europa.
eu/ smart -regulation/ guidelines/ ug_ chap7_ en. htm>.
32 Radaelli & Meuwese, 2009; A. Meuwese et al., ‘The OECD Framework for Regulatory Policy Eval‐
uation: An Initial Assessment’, European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2015, pp.
101-110.
33 Alemanno, 2015; F. Sarpi, ‘Better for Whom?’, European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 6, No. 3,
2015, pp. 372-374.
34 Dawson, 2016, p. 1220.
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case of financial sector governance, particularly, the amended Markets in Finan‐
cial Instruments Directive (MiFID II). They show that calibrating key provisions
in the directive, such as those concerning knowledge and expertise, is not a sim‐
ple exercise in rational problem definition and policy design. Investment firms,
banks, training institutes, and public organizations have mobilized and actively
sought to assert their views on the appropriate requirements for professional
knowledge and experience in MiFID II. The authors found greater responsiveness
to the concerns of financial industry actors about the economic costs of ‘red tape.’
Following the stakeholder consultation, the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA) opted for a minimum harmonization approach at the EU level.
Still, the final version of ESMA’s guidelines is more demanding in terms of years
of experience and the extent of training than was the case prior to 2008. ESMA
also supported giving the respective national competent authorities sufficient
remit to issue additional requirements in accordance with national laws and regu‐
latory practices.
The 2015 “Better Regulation” package also aims to close the gap between EU
institutions and citizens. Nevertheless, as Ranchordás shows in her contribution
to the special issue, the lack of appeal of public consultations caused by their com‐
plex and technical character has prevented several stakeholders not only from
speaking but also from being heard. Ranchordás’ article focuses on the EU public
consultation on the regulatory environment of online platforms and the collabo‐
rative economy. She examines whether citizens were seriously regarded as evi‐
dence providers and how their knowledge that materialized in individual narra‐
tives could contribute to more legitimate and, therefore, better regulation. She
argues that an evidence-based approach to regulation should also include citizen
narratives as they can provide first-hand and diverse perspectives, which might
not be considered in standard consultation questions. Citizen narratives can be
particularly useful in complex and rapidly evolving fields where there is still little
empirical evidence and where participants are likely to have diverse personal
experiences.
Ranchordás finds that the current, rather technocratic approach to public
consultations is not always accessible to most citizens or only focuses on a selec‐
ted number of regulatory issues. She advises that, in order to encourage citizen
participation in the consultations, the European Commission should allow for
more room for learning from citizens’ experiences by favoring open-ended ques‐
tions and additional room for comments. Citizen narratives can offer an addi‐
tional evidence-based tool that promotes better regulation while addressing the
problem of the technocratization of EU public consultations.
Furthermore, the consultation process and IA also bring up additional consid‐
erations about preserving the institutional balance at the EU level among the
Commission, Parliament, Council, national parliaments and other advisory bod‐
ies. In particular, it can be questioned whether the principle of institutional bal‐
ance is still adhered to with regards to the Commission’s key role in collecting
feedback after the adoption of a proposal as well as its prerogative to carry out an
IA after an amendment to a proposal is tabled and to assist the co-legislator in
their IA activities. Moreover, advisory bodies and national parliaments have
10 European Journal of Law Reform 2017 (19) 1-2
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somewhat reduced possibilities to provide input into EU decision-making, given
the Commission’s central role in managing the stakeholder consultation process.
Taken to an extreme, this trend may mean that national parliaments and advi‐
sory bodies, such as the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, may be regarded as ‘just another stakeholder.’
D Theme 3: Ex post Policy Evaluation, Regulatory Fitness and Performance
Checks
The Commission has signaled a strong commitment to assessing the expected
and actual impact of policies, legislation and other regulatory measures during all
stages of the policy cycle – from agenda-setting and planning to implementation,
evaluation and subsequent revision. The Commission has also emphasized the
importance of evidence-based analysis to guide the evaluation process. It set up
the REFIT platform explicitly in order to collect a broad spectrum of feedback on
how to reduce the regulatory burden. The new version of the REFIT evaluation
platform will enable EU policy-makers to conduct targeted and inclusive quantita‐
tive assessment of costs and benefits. As the Commission aims to deliver better
regulation across different levels of governance, it stresses that REFIT should fos‐
ter cooperation among the European institutions, member states and stakehold‐
ers in the framework of the “Regulatory Fitness Agenda.”
Policy evaluation received less attention in the preceding “Better Regulation”
package than IA. To compensate for this shortcoming, the current agenda extends
the reach of policy evaluation from financial instruments to regulatory instru‐
ments. Moreover, a stronger emphasis on linking ex ante and ex post evaluation
as well as stakeholder consultations and ex post evaluation in order to produce
more coherent legislation has been observed.35 The Commission also pledges to
take a more targeted approach, focusing only on “the most serious sources of
inefficiency and unnecessary burden.”36 Given the stronger experience with IAs in
the Commission DGs, it is crucial to ensure developing matching levels of staff
expertise in ex post evaluation. Currently, ex post evaluation is frequently out‐
sourced to external parties.
This also prompts the question whether the different epistemic communities
engaging in policy evaluation, such as economists, accountants, scholars of public
policy and political science, share the same learning objectives and understanding
of desirable policy goals and coherence. As we already noted in the stakeholder
consultation theme, making sense of the collected input is a challenge. It is simi‐
larly challenging to interpret and learn from the input generated by ex ante evalu‐
ation, especially when it comes to connecting it to the findings of ex post evalua‐
tion to facilitate reflexive governance at the EU level.
A further methodological challenge is that not all policy issues lend them‐
selves to the type of ex post evaluation commonly conducted by external policy
35 S. Smismans, ‘Policy Evaluation in the EU: The Challenges of Linking Ex Ante and Ex Post
Appraisal’, European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2015, pp. 6-25.
36 Commission Communication of 19 May 2015, COM(2015) 215 final, p. 9.
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consultants. For example, it has been problematic to operationalize constitutional
and fundamental rights questions present in EU legislation through benchmarks
and indicators. Picking up a challenge we encountered in the theme on IAs, in pol‐
icy evaluation too, one might think of difficulties for actors such as national par‐
liaments and courts to meaningfully participate in the evaluation process, which
seems to take place mainly within the executive branch of government.
The consequences of linking ex ante and ex post evaluation in the new “Bet‐
ter Regulation” package have been explored in Smismans’ contribution to this
special issue. He analyzes the changes in evaluation from an ex post tool of finan‐
cial accountability limited to expenditure programs, to an activity applicable
throughout the policy cycle for all types of policy intervention. This change will
inevitably bring about a degree of politicization in the evaluation process. This is
because evaluation is aimed at feeding in political judgment calls on what the
future objectives of EU policy-making should be. Smismans sees further evidence
of a trend towards politicizing evaluation in that this process is now generally
extended to regulatory intervention and not just expenditure policy. Thirdly, the
current inter-institutional dimension of evaluation might contribute to politiciz‐
ing the process, as it brings about a higher likelihood of blame-shifting and con‐
testation. Finally, politicization is increased by the various means in which the
new “Better Regulation” agenda enhances the participatory dimension of evalua‐
tion.
The challenges linked to collecting and analyzing information for evaluation
purposes are explored in Stephenson’s article. In particular, he departs from the
current challenge posed by the fact that the EU institutions need to develop staff
expertise in ex post evaluation, which has in the past been largely outsourced to
external parties. He then focuses on the role of the European Parliament by look‐
ing at the Parliament’s use of special reports produced by the European Court of
Auditors and by examining the emerging role of the European Parliamentary
Research Service in monitoring the outputs of the European Court of Auditors
and other bodies engaged in audit and evaluation. Stephenson concludes with the
observation that all scrutiny by MEPs is inherently political. However, while it is
likely that ex post evaluations conducted by objective external stakeholders have
the potential to become more quickly politicized, it is less likely that reports draf‐
ted in-house by the European Parliamentary Research Service will have a political
agenda.
E Theme 4: Alternative Forms of Regulation, Implementation and
Enforcement
The new “Better Regulation” agenda discusses the need to use both regulatory
and well-designed non-regulatory means as well as to consider “improvements in
the implementation and enforcement of existing legislation.”37 It aims to con‐
tinue the careful monitoring to ensure that EU directives are transposed in a
37 Ibid., p. 6.
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clear, correct and timely manner and that EU rules are properly implemented and
enforced in all member states. This is desirable because it brings about legal cer‐
tainty and allows citizens and businesses to benefit from the opportunities of the
single market.
Just as in the first “Better Regulation” package, and in fact already since the
White Paper on European Governance,38 the Commission emphasizes the need to
be responsive to the concerns of businesses and citizens when it comes to using a
top-down policy tool, by complementing the latter with other types of regulatory
instruments. This trend is partly driven by proportionality considerations, as in
some instances, the Commission and other EU legislative bodies possess less
information about the regulated policy area than the stakeholders. For example,
the development of private standards was prominent in the first “Better Regula‐
tion” package and was enthusiastically endorsed by business actors, who saw this
type of policy-making as a solution to the problems of too much regulation and
‘red tape.’
However, as Verbruggen reports in his article, empirical evidence in relation
to the old “Better Regulation” agenda lends itself to concluding that the Commis‐
sion’s ambition to encourage private regulation as a governance response to pol‐
icy issues at EU level has not delivered the promised results. He suggests that EU
interinstitutional politics and a lack of trust in industry self-regulatory capacity
have contributed to the sidelining of private regulation in the new “Better Regula‐
tion” agenda.
The question is, of course, whether the ‘failures’ of the old “Better Regula‐
tion” program are repaired in the 2015 package. Verbruggen suggests that while
the new agenda addresses some of the shortcomings of the old one, it still fails to
deliver a clear guidance on how alternative forms of regulation ought to be inte‐
grated into EU law-making policies. In particular, he addresses the concern that
co- and self-regulation are regarded as ‘alternatives to’ EU legislative action,
thereby neglecting the possibility to design a mix of regulatory instruments in
which private regulation complements EU legislation and concludes that while
the “Better Regulation Toolbox” does currently mention the possibility to com‐
bine the full range of policy options, there is no guidance offered on how to com‐
bine different regulatory instruments. All in all, the contribution by Verbruggen
shows a lack of overarching vision of the role of co- and self-regulation on the
part of the EU institutions, despite their clear benefits. This might disincentivize
private actors such as trade associations, NGOs and other public interest groups
from engaging in those forms of regulation.
While co- and self-regulation undoubtedly have several advantages, they also
present clear shortcomings. First, a potential bind spot of private standards is the
possibility to ensure uniform implementation and rigorous enforcement. Private
standards most commonly operate through voluntary compliance and reputa‐
tional enforcement mechanisms. In financial sector governance, in particular, the
2008 global financial crisis revealed significant shortcomings of the ‘deregulation’
paradigm in the 1990s and 2000s and the inadequacy of private industry stan‐
38 Commission Communication of 25 July 2001, COM(2001) 428 final.
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dards to bring about financial stability.39 Furthermore, especially regarding co-
regulation, there are serious legitimacy concerns. From this perspective, it can be
observed that the “Better Regulation” agenda seems to encourage forms of regula‐
tion that escape traditional legal and political accountability mechanisms.
This topic is addressed in Eliantonio’s contribution, which examines the case
study of the European standardization process. The legitimacy concerns linked to
the European standardization process arise because the process operates arguably
at the ‘edges’ of the Meroni doctrine,40 as the workings of the European Standard‐
ization Organizations can hardly be considered a form of delegation of ‘non-dis‐
cretionary’ powers, given the inherent political choices which are made therein. In
this light, Eliantonio shows that participatory and ex ante control mechanisms in
the process merely remain a paper reality, in light of the stakeholders’ and the
Commission’s lack of sufficient expertise to keep up with the industry’s know-
how. This situation exacerbates the need for judicial control, which, as Eliantonio
shows, is currently underdeveloped, if not completely lacking. This important co-
regulation mechanism is, therefore, seen to be currently operating outside the
mandated constitutional boundaries.
F Conclusions
Departing from an interdisciplinary approach which integrates legal and political
science perspectives, this special issue aimed to shed light on one overarching
research question: is there evidence of enduring politicization despite the empha‐
sis on neutral evidence-based policy-making? The contributions to the special
issue investigated four central themes in the EU’s new “Better Regulation” pack‐
age, following the policy cycle: regulatory streamlining and cleaning-up of EU leg‐
islation; stakeholder consultations and IA; policy evaluation and regulatory fit‐
ness and performance checks; alternative forms of regulation, implementation
and enforcement.
With the new “Better Regulation” agenda, the Commission has developed
robust procedures to consult a broader set of stakeholders when preparing legisla‐
tion, engage in systematic IAs in all policy areas and link policy evaluation to sub‐
sequent policy formulation. As the articles in this special issue have shown, how‐
ever, politics frequently trumps procedures. To begin with, there are contradic‐
tions among some of the priorities of the “Better Regulation” package, particu‐
larly, between the aims to streamline, prioritize and rationalize policy-making
and the ambition to ensure meaningful civil society consultation. Furthermore,
greater responsiveness to stakeholders, optimized evidence collection and analy‐
39 C. Woll, The Power of Inaction: Bank Bailouts in Comparison, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press,
2014; K.L. Young, ‘Transnational Regulatory Capture? An Empirical Examination of the Transna‐
tional Lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’, Review of International Political
Economy, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2012, pp. 663-688; A.W. Chalmers, ‘Financial Industry Mobilization and
Securities Markets Regulation in Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 54, No. 3,
2015, pp. 482-501.
40 Case 9-56, Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v. High Authority [1958] ECR 133.
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sis do not eliminate the need to make difficult political choices about the policy
goals that the EU wants to achieve. “Better Regulation” has, therefore, implica‐
tions for winners and losers when policy changes. All in all, we observe enduring
politicization of policy-making despite the commitment to evidence-based policy-
making, with tools and procedures having the potential to be used according to
political logics. In conclusion, it can be stated that despite its seemingly neutral
and apolitical overarching objectives, the “Better Regulation” agenda does not
eliminate the need to make political choices across the policy cycle. At a time of
political turmoil in the EU, it remains a significant challenge to reconcile busi‐
ness-friendly policy objectives such as ‘cutting red tape’ with making policy more
responsive to the wishes of citizens and civil society and, at the same time, sub‐
ject to a strict cost-benefit analysis.
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